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ABSTRACT: Can the South African Reserve Bank‟s (SARB) substantially control inflation 
within their set target of 3-6 percent? We sought to investigate this phenomenon by 
examining multiple threshold effects in the persistence levels of quarterly aggregated 
inflation data collected between 2003 and 2014. To this end, we employ the three-regime 
threshold autoregressive (TAR) model of Hansen (2000). We favour this approach over other 
conventional linear econometric models as it permits us to test for varying persistency within 
the autoregressive (AR) components of the inflation process. Our empirical explorations 
reveal that the SARB‟s set target does indeed lie within a range in which inflation is found to 
be most persistent. Overall and more importantly, our results suggest that the SARB should 
either consider revising their set inflation target by redefining the inflation target range to 
accommodate higher inflation rates or the Reserve Bank should consider abandoning the 
inflation targeting regime altogether. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
A substantial body of literature advocates on the pre-assumed advantages of inflation 
targeting as a superior framework for monetary policy in comparison to other policy 
alternatives (Levin et. al., 2004; Gurkaynak et. al., 2006; and Goncalves and Salles, 2006). 
One widely accredited view as to why inflation targeting has gained so many adherents is 
based upon the perception of monetary policy being unable to simultaneously attain capital 
mobility, a fixed exchange rate and independent monetary policy. This phenomenon is 
popularly referred to as a monetary policy „tri-lemma‟ and implies that an open economy can 
achieve only two of the three stated goals at a given time (Zaidi, 2006). Following the Asian 
crisis in 1998, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommended monetary authorities 
worldwide to adopt a combination of free float exchange rates and inflation rate targets as a 
means of lessening the probability of a currency crisis while pursuing policy objectives 
focused on the stability in domestic prices (Ito, 2007). For the specific case of South Africa, 
financial liberalization and a diluted relationship between the growth in money supply, output 
growth and prices made previously employed monetary growth targets less useful as policy 
objectives (Levin et. al., 2004). Moreover, South Africa‟s financial integration on an 
internationally platform has resulted in high levels of international capital flows over the last 
couple of decades or so. This has made it extremely challenging for the SARB to gear 
monetary policy by targeting monetary aggregates, or by pegging an exchange rate without 
harming employment and output growth. In light of the aforementioned macroeconomic 
developments, inflation targets were therefore deemed as being the ideal monetary policy 
framework. 
 
Within the design of an inflation targeting framework, Central Banks are not only 
concerned with stabilizing actual inflation around a pre-determined inflation range; but they 
are also challenged with selecting a pre-determined inflation rate which they could effectively 
control. It is thus crucial for Central Banks to select an optimal inflation target after 
conducting a rigorous and comprehensive analysis of inflation dynamics (Odhiambo, 2011). 
If policymakers, for instance, mistakenly adopt a specific optimal inflation target without a 
proper understanding of the dynamics of inflation persistence, then any prolonged financial 
instability associated with the inability to control inflation rates would be an outcome of 
chasing overambitious policy targets (Orphandes, 2001). By examining specific statistical 
properties of the autoregressive (AR) process of a univariate series of the inflation rate, 
policymakers can measure the extent to which the inflation rate is persistent. The underlying 
notion of highly persistent inflation process implies that monetary authorities do not have 
sufficient control over the inflation rate, such that any shock to the inflation variable will 
result in disequilibrium from the long-run steady-state path. In the opposite case of a lowly 
persistent process, central banks can be deemed as exerting a controlling influence over the 
inflation rate since the time series reverts back to long-run equilibrium, even in the face of 
macroeconomic shocks.  
 
From an academic perspective, a plethora of studies have sought to investigate 
persistence within inflation data either by adopting a single-country approach (Rangasamy, 
2009, and Kang et. al., 2009) or through panel data methods (Kumar and Okimoto, 2007). 
And even more recently, an accumulating amount of empirical evidence has advocated for 
nonlinearity existing in the data generating process of the inflation variable. This observation 
holds true for both developing economies (Khadaroo, 2005 and Mourelle et. al., 2011, Arize 
and Malindretos, 2012) as well as industrialized countries (Cuestas and Harrison, 2010 and 
Zhou, 2013). The policy ramifications of nonlinear inflation dynamics are quite intriguing as 
they imply that the levels of persistence differ at various ranges of the inflation rate. For 
instance, Khadaroo (2005) employs Hansen‟s (1996) two-regime self-exciting threshold 
autoregressive (SETAR) model to investigate the threshold effects in the inflation process for 
Indian, Singaporean and South African consumer price index (CPI) data between the periods 
of 1976-2002. Inflation threshold estimates of 3.4%, -1.3% and 14% are obtained for India, 
Singapore and South Africa respectively. Above the defined inflation threshold point for 
South African data, the SARC is lower in comparison to inflation rates below this threshold. 
Conversely, for the cases of both Indian and Singaporean data, the SARC is lower below the 
established thresholds and turns higher above the threshold. In effect, the implications of the 
results obtained for South African data puts in question the effectiveness of the SARB‟s 
inflation target and whether the specified target of 3-6% creates an economic environment for 
desirably lower levels of persistence in the inflation process.  
 
And yet it should be noted that the empirical analysis of Khadaroo (2005) was 
conducted for periods prior to the adoption of the inflation target mandate, a shortcoming 
which this study attempts to overcome. Our paper hence extends upon the work of Khadaroo 
(2005) by investigating threshold effects in the AR properties of the inflation process within 
the context of Hansen‟s (2000) three-regime TAR framework for aggregated and 
disaggregated measures of South African monthly inflation data collected between 2002:01-
2014:05. One of the principle advantages of this model framework is that it enables us to 
directly plug-in the 3 and 6 percent target zones as double inflation thresholds within the 
TAR model specification. Thereafter we are able to subjectively estimate the SARC of the 
TAR model for the range of 3-6 percent as well as being further enabled to identify whether 
persistence is lower or higher in regimes outside the 3-6 percent range. Hence the novelty of 
our contribution becomes apparent as we are able to directly assess whether the 3-6 inflation 
target range as set by the SARB indeed encompasses a highly persistence inflation range for 
both aggregated as well as disaggregated measures of inflation. Therefore, against this 
backdrop, we structure the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 is the literature 
review which is further divided into two sub sections. Section 3 outlines the empirical three-
regime SETAR framework. Section 4 introduces the utilized inflation data and also presents 
our empirical findings; the paper is concluded in the fifth section of the paper in the form of 
associated policy implications derived from the empirical analysis. 
 
2 INFLATION TARGETING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
A dominant trend in the practice of monetary policy has been its dedication to price 
stability as well as Central Bank independence. Monetary authorities worldwide have 
undertaken these commitments, either by statutory mandates issued from their governments 
or by exercises of discretion granted to them by relevant monetary authorities. Amongst a 
host of other Central Banks, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has demonstrated its 
commitment to both price stability and Central Bank independence through the adoption of 
an „inflation-targeting‟ regime. According to Epstein (2003), an inflation targeting framework 
is a neo-liberal approach to central banking in which monetary authorities attempt to; keep 
inflation at a defined low level; reduce central bank support for government deficits; help 
manage the country‟s integration into world trade and financial markets; and vigorously 
reduce the influence of democratic social and political forces on central bank policy. Other 
commentators, such as Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), have outlined the key elements 
of a „full-fledged‟ inflation targeting regime, as consisting of an institutional commitment to 
price stability; in the absence of nominal anchors and fiscal dominance; yet dependent on 
policy instrument independence as well as on policy transparency and policy accountability. 
As an operative policy instrument for policy conduct in South Africa, the SARB has been 
granted, at its discretion, the manipulation of short-term nominal interest rates which it uses 
as a means of achieving a financial stable environment. In turn, a financially stable 
environment has been explicitly defined by the SARB as inflation rates ranging between 3-6 
percent. So even though financial stability may not exclusively be a panacea for overall 
economic development, it is highly recognized that without financial stability the sustainment 
of a conducive economic environment for growth cannot be attained (Swanepoel, 2004).  
 
In February 2000, the former governor of the Reserve Bank, Tito Mboweni, 
announced the SARB‟s adoption of formal inflation targeting regime. The pre-announced 
inflation-target was set at a range of between 3 to 6 percent and this target was to be first met 
in 2002. The adoption of the inflation targeting (IT) framework has clearly strengthened the 
SARB‟s mandate which is primarily built upon four policy pillars namely; policy focus, 
policy co-ordination, transparency and accountability. Generally, these pillars contribute to 
the SARB‟s move away from the previously eclectic monetary policy frameworks. By 
outlaying an inflation target range, the SARB is granted greater flexibility when 
implementing monetary policy. Generally under an inflation targeting regime, a particular 
index must fall within the bands of a specific target range and within a specific time frame as 
determined by the Minister of Finance. The inflation objective is also publically announced 
and a clear commitment to achieve this objective is spelt out; thus helping to shape the 
public‟s inflation expectations. Ultimately, the forward-looking inflation targeting strategy 
helps planning as well as providing an anchor for expectations of future inflation to influence 
price and wage setting decisions (Naraidoo and Gupta, 2010). Moreover, the SARB has opted 
for a price index that is comprehensive in terms of item and geographical coverage. The 
chosen CPIX measure covers metropolitan and other urban areas where prices are surveyed, 
also ensuring a wide geographical coverage of price information as possible (Casteleijn, 
1999). The 3-6 inflation target range was established by the government but only after 
consultation with the SARB and it is believed that the chosen target is not too narrow thus 
enhancing monetary policy credibility. All-in-all, the selected target demonstrates the 
Reserve Bank re-owned desire for the inflation process in the new millennium to move the 
country in a direction of price stability.  
 
Nonetheless, disputes have risen as to the effectiveness of the current design of the 
inflation targeting regime. Two separate arguments have been put forward by academic 
researchers, on one hand, as well as by structuralist-based groups such as COSATU, on the 
other hand. The latter group argues for the complete abandonment of the inflation targeting 
regime in favour of alternative structural macroeconomic policies such as exchange rates 
targets, unemployment targets and dual/mixed policy frameworks. This structuralist argument 
is that fundamental processes such as openness, political instability and tax policy play a 
large role in promoting economic growth in developing countries like South Africa as 
opposed to macroeconomic policy of price stability (Epstein, 2003). Conversely, a handful of 
research connoisseurs have not necessarily called for the abandonment of inflation targets, 
but rather advocate for a revision of the current inflation target to accommodate a wider 
target range. The argument put forth by group of academic connoisseurs is that a wider 
inflation target may be a more viable policy option for Reserve Bank. All in all, it is 
noteworthy that both groups commonly argue/contend that current monetary policy conduct 
in South Africa is too restrictive on the macroeconomy and ultimately such arguments place 
criticism on the price stabilization orthodox approach of the South African Reserve Bank 
(SARB) in its conduct of monetary policy. Henceforth, the presented criticism on the 
effectiveness of the adopted inflation-target regime can be empirically addressed on the basis 
of whether the current inflation target range set by the Reserve Bank does encompass an 
inflation range which is highly persistent. 
 
3 STYLIZED FACTS OF INFLATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Nell (2000) succinctly summarizes South Africa‟s inflationary experiences into five 
distinct regimes which he conveniently classifies as; periods of low inflation (1960-1970); 
periods of accelerating inflation (1971-1985); high inflation periods
1
 (1986-1993); single-
digit inflation periods (1994-2001) and the post-inflation targeting era (2002-2014). Table 1 
provides a summary of the CPI inflation rate descriptive statistics associated with these 
periods (whilst Figures 1-5 are the associated time series plots of these inflation periods). 
 
  
                                                 
1
 In the original study of Nell (2000), the author categorizes 1986-1993 as a deflationary period. Due to the fact that a very 
high estimate of average inflation has been computed between these years, this study opts to classify it as a period of high 
inflation. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of CPI inflation: 1960-2014 
Date/period Mean minimum 1
st
 quartile Median 3
rd
 quartile Maximum 
1960-1970 2.62 0.400 1.675 2.500 3.525 4.500 
1971-1985 11.27 3.500 9.60 11.70 13.70 18.50 
1986-1993 14.41 8.900 13.10 14.70 15.70 20.90 
1994-2001 7.098 1.700 5.650 7.050 9.000 11.100 
2002-2014 5.917 0.200 3.900 5.700 7.000 13.700 
Source: Authors own calculation based on data obtained from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) database. 
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The 1960‟s were characterized by periods of low inflation rates which coincided with 
inflation rates experienced by South Africa‟s industrialized trading partners. According to 
Nell (2000), exchange rate devaluations during the early 1970‟s and the oil price shock of 
1973 and 1979 led to accelerating inflation in the 1970‟s. An increase in the gold price in 
1979 and the legalisation of black trade unions in 1980 also contributed to high inflation rates 
experienced in the early 1980‟s (Akinboade et. al., 2002). Following the de Kock 
Commission‟s report in 1986, M3 money supply targets became the anchor of monetary 
policy conduct in South Africa. Concerning inflation in the 1980‟s and early 1990‟s, Luca 
(2006) points out that whilst South Africa‟s main trading partners experienced decreasing 
rates of inflation during this period, weaker monetary policy stance and political instability 
within the economy lead to higher inflation rates. Abolishment of trade sanctions, increased 
financial liberalization and political settlement contributed largely to the decline of inflation 
in the 1990‟s (Aron and Meullbauer, 2007). Casteleijn (2002) also highlights that resulting 
structural developments associated with the stabilizing of the economy weakened the 
correlation between money supply growth, inflation and output in the 1990‟s, thereby probing 
monetary authorities to question the use of monetary targets as policy guidelines.  
 
Eventually in 2000, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) announced its adoption 
of a formal inflation target framework with set targets of 3-6 percent which was then planned 
to be met in 2002. The post inflation targeting era has been characterized by a record low 
inflation rate of 0.21 percent in January 2004 to a peak of 13.7 percent in July 2008. The 
increasing trend of inflation experienced in the South African economy subsequent to 
adopting the IT framework can be attributed to a number of factors inclusive of rising food, 
oil and other commodity prices over a period of strong global demand and economic growth. 
Moreover, the sharp depreciation of local currency experienced from early 2006 to January 
2009 further contributed to rising inflation transmitted through an increase in import prices. 
With the exception of these post-IT era supply shock episodes, inflation has since remained 
within single-digit figures and has been characterized by unprecedented fluctuations within 
and outside the target boundaries. Rationally speaking, it is easy to understand why the 
Reserve Bank choose a relatively low inflation target since high inflation can have an adverse 
effect on certain accounting measures and taxes, it negatively affects the poor, distorts 
relative prices and slightly discourages savings and investments, which tends to make 
economic decisions more difficult in the long run. But the Reserve Bank cannot seem to be 
controlling the inflation rate, not to mention keeping it within their target region. Currently 
the inflation rate is at 6.60 percent, which is approximately 0.60 percent above the target 
ceiling. Within the 6 month period of observation, the inflation rate has been operating within 
the upper boundary of the inflation target and has not operated around the lower end of the 
target a few months prior to that observation. This basically stipulates that the Reserve Bank 
has barely managed to keep the inflation rate under control for a sustainable period of time; 
an observation which puts into question as to whether the SARB‟s inflation target range 
encompasses a highly persistent inflation range. Our paper empirically addresses this concern 
using a 3 regime TAR model introduced in the following section of our paper.  
  
4 EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Consider a univariate time series yt whose data generating process evolves as a three-
regime SETAR similarly to that documented in Hansen (2000): 
 
𝑦𝑡 =  
𝜑11𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜑12𝑦𝑡−2 + 𝜑13𝑦𝑡−3 + ⋯+ 𝜑1𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝𝐼. (𝑦𝑡−1 < 𝜆1)
𝜑21𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜑22𝑦𝑡−2 + 𝜑23𝑦𝑡−3 + ⋯+ 𝜑2𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝𝐼. (𝜆1 < 𝑦𝑡−1) ≤ 𝜆2)
𝜑31𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜑32𝑦𝑡−2 + 𝜑33𝑦𝑡−3 + ⋯+ 𝜑3𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝𝐼. (𝑦𝑡−1 > 𝜆2)
  (1) 
 
Alternatively, equation (1) can be re-specified in the following compact regression 
specification: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛺𝑡 𝜆1,𝜆2 + 𝜀𝑡          (2) 
 
Where: 
 
𝛺𝑡 = (𝑦𝑡−1,𝑦𝑡−2,… ,𝑦𝑡−𝑝) 
𝛺𝑡 𝜆1,𝜆2 =  𝛺𝑡𝐼.  𝑦𝑡−1 < 𝜆1 ; 𝛺𝑡𝐼.  𝜆1 < 𝑦𝑡−1 ≤ 𝜆2 ;  𝛺𝑡𝐼. (𝑦𝑡−1 > 𝜆2))  
𝜑1𝑖 = 𝜑11 ,𝜑12 ,… ,𝜑1𝑝  
𝜑2𝑖 = 𝜑21 ,𝜑22 ,… ,𝜑2𝑝  
𝜑3𝑖 = 𝜑31 ,𝜑32 ,… ,𝜑3𝑝  
𝛽 = (𝜑1𝑖 ,𝜑2𝑖 ,𝜑3𝑖) 
 
In referring to regression equations (1) and (2), the threshold variables (i.e. λ1, λ2) 
which govern the regime switching behaviour of the time series are ordered such that λ1 < λ2. 
Essentially, the SETAR model, as represented in equations (1) and (2), is piecewise 
econometric specification which allows the slope coefficients (φ1i, φ2i, φ3i) to differ 
depending upon the values of λ1 and λ2. Since, in our case study, the threshold values are 
known a prior, as in Tong and Lim (1980), then the coefficient values of the regime slope 
coefficients can be directly estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS) yielding estimates of: 
 
𝛽  𝜆1,𝜆2 = ( 𝛺𝑡(𝜆1,𝜆2)𝛺𝑡(𝜆1, 𝜆2)′)
−1( 𝑥𝑡 𝜆1,𝜆2 𝑦𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                         (3) 
  
The regression residuals are extracted as: 
  
𝜀 𝜆1,𝜆2 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝛺𝑡(𝜆1,𝜆2)′𝛽  𝜆1,𝜆2       (4) 
 
And the sample variance is defined as: 
  
𝜍  𝑛
2 𝜆1,𝜆2 =  
𝜀 (𝜆1,𝜆2)
2
𝑛 −  𝑘 + 𝑚 
𝑛
𝑡=1
                                                                                            (5) 
 
For empirical purposes we re-specify the three-regime SETAR model by placing an 
inflation series (πt) as the observable time series consisting of two known inflation thresholds 
of values 3 and 6, such that λ1 = 3, λ2 = 6. The resulting estimation SETAR regression can 
thus be depicted as follows: 
 
𝜋𝑡 = ( 𝑎𝑘𝜋𝑡−𝑘
𝑝
𝑗=1
)𝐼. 3%>𝜋𝑡 + ( 𝑏𝑘𝜋𝑡−𝑘
𝑝
𝑗=1
)𝐼. 3%≤𝜋𝑡<6% + ( 𝑐𝑘𝜋𝑡−𝑘
𝑝
𝑗=1
)𝐼. 𝜋𝑡>6%     (6) 
 
Conventionally, inflation persistence is measured as the SARC of each of the 
individual regimes of the SETAR process such that inflation persistence under the first 
regime is given by (𝜌1 =  𝑎𝑘
𝑝
𝑗=1 ); whereas in the corridor regime persistence is measured as 
(𝜌2 =  𝑏𝑘
𝑝
𝑗=1 ) and in the third regime as (𝜌3 =  𝑐𝑘
𝑝
𝑗=1 ). Thereafter, the inflation process 
within each of the regimes is considered or rendered as being persistent if it satisfies the 
condition (𝜌𝑖  ≥ 1). As conveniently explained by Rangasamy (2009), when the SARC is 
above unity, then this implies that the series behaves as a non-mean reverting process which 
does not return back to its equilibrium path in the event of a shock to the variable. 
Conversely, when the SARC is found to be less than unity (i.e. 𝜌𝑖  < 1), then shocks to 
inflation will dissipate and the time series will revert to its equilibrium level. 
 
5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
5.1  DATA EMPIRICAL 
 
Our empirical dataset comprises of monthly data which has been collected from the 
SARB website for the periods of between 2003:01 to 2014:04; thus yielding a total of 136 
observations for each observed time series. Our dataset includes 4 aggregated measures of 
inflation, 8 measures of disaggregated time series of commodities and 6 measures of 
disaggregated measures of service prices. In particular:  
 The aggregated measures of inflation are: total consumer prices; total consumer prices 
of commodities and total consumer prices of services. 
 The disaggregated measures of commodities are: food and non-alcoholic beverages; 
housing and utilities; household contents, equipment and maintenance; health, 
transport; communication; recreation and culture; and miscellaneous items. 
 The disaggregated measures of services: housing and utilities; household contents, 
equipment and maintenance; transport; communication; recreation and culture; and 
miscellaneous items. 
 
5.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
Table 2 presents the estimation results of the three-regime SETAR regressions for 
aggregated measures of inflation. By definition ρ1 represents a measure of inflation 
persistence for observations below the lower margin of the inflation target (i.e. π < 3%), 
whereas ρ2 measures persistence of the inflation process within the target (i.e. 3% < π < 6%) 
and ρ3 measures persistence for inflation rates above the upper margin of the inflation target 
(i.e. π > 6%). In defining these different measures of persistence, we are able to conveniently 
investigate persistence levels of inflation within and outside the boundaries of the SARB 
inflation target mandate. Bearing this analogy in mind, two main conclusions can thus be 
drawn from our empirical results reported in Table 1. Firstly, it should be noted that for all 
aggregated measures of inflation, the SARC is above unity in the corridor regime of the 
SETAR specification (i.e. 3% < π < 6%). In other words, our results emphasize the fact that 
the Reserve Bank‟s set target range of 3-6 percent has indeed encompassed a persistent 
inflation range. Moreover, we observe that inflation persistence is highest within the corridor 
regime of the SETAR models, that is, with the sole exception of total CPI in which we 
discover that inflation is most persistent in the lowest regime of the SETAR model (i.e. π < 
3%). As a second conclusion, we also observe that the lowest levels of inflation persistence 
occur within the third regime of the SETAR model specifications (i.e. π > 6%). This finding 
holds true for all aggregated measures of inflation with the exception of persistence in the 
inflation of commodity goods in which we find that inflation is least persistence within the 
lower regime of the SETAR specification (i.e. π < 3%). Moreover, we note that within the 
third regime of the SETAR model, all SARC estimates are significantly below unity, a 
finding that indicates that inflation within aggregated items is not persistence. Thus in 
collectively, summarizing the results reported in Table 2, it would be safe to assume that the 
Reserve Bank would be more effective at administering inflation rates which are above the 
upper target zone of 6 percent. 
 
Table 2: Persistence at aggregated inflation 
 
time series 
SARC AIC MAPE Residual 
variance 
𝜍  𝑛
2 𝜆1, 𝜆2  
DW 
statistic 
ρ1 
π < 3% 
ρ2 
3% ≤ π ≤ 
6% 
ρ3 
π > 6% 
CPIX excl. 
petrol 
0.969 
[26.67%] 
1.073 
[51.11%] 
0.764 
[22.22%] 
-133 15.06% 0.344 1.965 
total cpi 1.074 
[12.59%] 
1.024 
[53.33%] 
0.967 
[34.07%] 
-140 15.14% 0.3269 2.254 
 
total 
commodities 
0.962 
[16.3%] 
1.015 
[51.11%] 
0.988 
[32.59%] 
-33 13.14% 0.7174 2.014 
total services 0.973 
[13.33%] 
1.069 
[45.19%] 
0.784 
[41.48%] 
-72 14.58% 0.5402 1.987 
Note: percentage of observations in each regime is reported in []. DW represents the Durbin Watson test statistic for autocorrelation.  
Source: Authors using data from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) database 
 
In proceeding with our analysis, we turn now to our attention to the estimation results 
reported for disaggregate measures of inflation as provided in Table 3 for commodities and 
Table 4 for services. In firstly referring to the results reported in Table 3, we note a biasness 
in the results obtained for disaggregated measures of commodities in comparison to the 
results obtained for the aggregated measure of total commodities as previously reported in 
Table 2. In particular, we observe that with the exception of recreation and miscellaneous 
items, the remaining disaggregated measures of commodity inflation have SARC estimates 
which are well below unity within all regimes of the SETAR processes. However, in 
attempting to identify the regime of the SETAR processes which contain the highest SARC, 
our results then become partially mixed. For instance, we observe that half (4 out of the 8) of 
the disaggregated measures of commodity prices have the lowest SARC‟s at inflation rates 
above 6 percent. These items are clothing, maintenance, communication and recreational 
goods. Furthermore, we are able to only identify two item in which inflation persistence is 
minimized in the corridor regime for disaggregated measures of commodities, (i.e. transport 
and miscellaneous items) and only another two items is inflation persistence minimized in the 
lower regimes (i.e. food and health items). Conversely, we find that the highest values of the 
SARC in the lowest regime are found maintenance, transport and communication in the 
lowest regime; for clothing, health and recreation in the middle regime; and for food and 
miscellaneous items in the upper regime of the SETAR processes. All-in-all, as a general 
finding, we find persistence to be relatively lower for disaggregated measures of commodity 
inflation in comparison to aggregated measure of total commodities. 
 
  
Table 3: Persistence at disaggregated inflation (commodities) 
 
 
time series 
SARC AIC MAPE Residual 
variance 
𝜍  𝑛
2 𝜆1, 𝜆2  
DW 
statistic ρ1 
π < 3% 
ρ2 
3% < π < 
6% 
ρ3 
π > 6% 
food 0.743 
[28.15%] 
0.771 
[20%] 
0.960 
[51.85%] 
-39 13.94% 0.6878 1.879 
housing 0.931 
[2.0%] 
0.9778 
[15.04%] 
0.508 
[82.96%] 
22 5.678% 1.105 1.968 
maintenance 0.946 
[83.7%] 
0.856 
[10.37%] 
0.283 
[5.93%] 
-123 55.28% 0.3699 2.015 
health 0.761 
[20.74%] 
0.930 
[48.89%] 
0.893 
[30.37%] 
15 15.21% 1.025 1.865 
transport 0.950 
[61.48%] 
0.721 
[24.44%] 
0.727 
[14.07%] 
96 72.88% 1.859 2.154 
communication 0.994 
[82.22%] 
0.800 
[8.15%] 
0.632 
[9.63%] 
86 30.91% 1.72 2.014 
recreation 1.000 
[80.74%] 
2.064 
[10.37%] 
0.985 
[8.89%] 
62 42.85% 1.449 2.001 
miscellaneous 0.911 
[54.81%] 
0.847 
[28.15%] 
1.008 
[17.04%] 
-44 36.24% 0.6623 1.879 
Note: percentage of observations in each regime is reported in []. DW represents the Durbin Watson test statistic for autocorrelation.  
Source: Authors using data from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) database 
 
In diverting our attention to the empirical estimates obtained for the disaggregate 
measures of services, as reported in Table 4, our estimation results become even more mixed 
as well as less definitive. In this regard, our attempts in identifying the overall regimes of the 
SETAR processes which contain the highest and lowest SARC for disaggregated measures of 
services becomes futile since we observe that the number of items containing the lowest and 
highest SARC‟s are exactly the same for each of the SETAR regimes. For instance, we find 
that the highest SARC in the lower regime are found for two items (i.e. housing and 
recreation); the highest SARC in corridor regime are also found for two items (i.e. 
communication and miscellaneous items); and highest SARC in the upper regime are 
similarly found for two items (maintenance and transport). Conversely, we find that the 
lowest SARC in the lower regime is found for two items (i.e. maintenance and 
miscellaneous); the lowest SARC in the middle regime are found for two items (i.e. housing 
and transport) and the lowest SARC in the upper regime are found for two items (i.e. 
communication and recreation). Given the general ambiguous nature of the aforementioned 
results, we are left with no option but to conclude that disaggregate measures of inflation 
persistence tend to be less in comparison to aggregate measures. Such reasoning can be 
deemed as being plausible as it is reminiscent of Backecby et. al. (2008) who suggest that 
inflation persistence experienced at the aggregate level may arise, to certain extent, due to 
aggregation bias and due to the fact that idiosyncratic shocks will tend to disappear when a 
substantial number of series are aggregated. 
 
Table 4: Persistence at disaggregated inflation (services) 
 
 
time series 
SARC AIC MAPE Residual 
variance 
𝜍  𝑛
2 𝜆1, 𝜆2  
DW 
statistic ρ1 
π < 3% 
ρ2 
3% < π < 
6% 
ρ3 
π > 6% 
housing 0.952 
[25.93%] 
0.327 
[46.67%] 
0.713 
[27.14%] 
189 43.91% 3.664 2.045 
maintenance 0.451 
[7.41%] 
0.875 
[42.96%] 
0.943 
[49.63%] 
46 23.33% 1.284 1.823 
transport 0.774 
[58.52%] 
0.752 
[12.59%] 
0.784 
[28.89%] 
127 22.61% 2.331 1.956 
communication 0.935 
[87.41%] 
7.500 
[3.7%] 
0.134 
[8.89%] 
-82 45.7% 0.5002 2.165 
recreation 0.973 
[57.04%] 
0.716 
[33.33%] 
0.179 
[9.63%] 
110 21.81% 2.054 2.456 
miscellaneous 0.828 
[29.63%] 
1.036 
[40.74%] 
1.004 
[29.63%] 
-57 16.79% 0.6009% 1.785 
Note: percentage of observations in each regime is reported in []. DW represents the Durbin Watson test statistic for autocorrelation.  
Source: Authors using data from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) database 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of our current study was to observe threshold effects in the persistence of 
the inflation process for South Africa between the monthly periods 2003-2014 for both 
aggregate and disaggregated data series. To this end, we employ Hansesn‟s (2000) 3-regime 
SETAR model with two known thresholds. We allow these two threshold points to coincide 
with the SARB‟s set inflation target mandate of 3 and 6 percent. As an application of this 
empirical strategy, we are able to evaluate as to whether or not the SARRB‟s inflation target 
encompasses a highly persistent inflation range. Generally, we consider this empirical 
endeavor as being worthwhile since it bears direct relevance towards monetary policy 
conduct in the sense of permitting us to determine as to whether the SARB has been able to 
effectively control inflation within its designated inflation target of 3 to 6 percent.  
 
The overall findings obtained from our empirical analysis can be summarized as 
follows. Concerning aggregated price measures, we establish that inflation within the time 
series is highly persistent within the 3-6 percent range as stipulated by the Reserve Bank. In 
particular, we observe that inflation is most persistent at rates of between 3 and 6 percent for 
total commodities as well as total services and at rates of below 3 percent for total CPI. 
Moreover, we also find that the lowest levels of persistent are found at rates above 6 percent 
concerning all price indices. Collectively, these results imply that when aggregate inflation is 
within the SARB‟s inflation target or at rates lower than its lower margin, then monetary 
authorities have to rely on a more forceful application of interest rates in order to ensure that 
inflation stays within its target range. Concerning the disaggregated measures of inflation, we 
note that persistence within these time series substantially diminishes; a result which can be 
attributed to the existing aggregation biasness in the persistence of South African inflation.  
 
In drawing a final conclusion to our empirical study, our overall results emphasize on 
the fact that the South African Reserve Bank has not been very successful in stabilizing 
aggregate inflation subsequent to the adoption of the inflation targeting regime. This fact 
holds true from both a practical as well as empirical perspective. Hence, our paper joins a 
host of observers, commentators and other academic connoisseurs in calling for either the 
abandonment or the revision of the inflation target. In the event that the Reserve Bank opts to 
revise its inflation target mandate, then it must consider extending its target range to 
accommodate higher levels of inflation. Practically speaking, this could be achieved by 
amending both the lower and upper margins of its current target range. And yet, it could still 
be questioned, that if the Reserve Bank does opt to alter the margins of the inflation target, at 
what range(s) should it modify it to? We thus leave such concerns for future research, which 
we encourage to focus on identifying inflation rates which would stabilize exchange rates, 
maximize economic growth and minimize unemployment rates. 
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